Foreign Policy
February 12, 2013
By Juan Nagel

Courtesy of: Getty Images

In a widely expected move, the Venezuelan government announced last Friday that it would devalue its currency by 32 percent. The Venezuela Bolívar (BsF) will now trade at 6.3 BsF per U.S. dollar, up from 4.3 BsF per dollar. This costly move was probably influenced by events that took place halfway around the world, in Beijing.

The first question a casual observer might ask is why the government needed to devalue. The answer is simple, and it relates to the peculiar role the state plays in Venezuela’s economy.

The government-owned oil monopoly is the only significant exporter in the country, and thus is also the only supplier of hard currency into the market. Since 2003 (and following a long tradition that dates to Chávez’s predecessors), the Venezuelan state has set the price of the dollar far below the market price as a way of subsidizing everything the country imports, which includes pretty much everything. Since most of its spending is in the local currency, the price at which it sells its petro-dollars determines much of the government’s income. In effect, Venezuela’s currency regime and its fiscal policy are one and the same.

Selling dollars at below-market prices is tremendously costly for the state, which last year ran a record-setting deficit of 15 percent of GDP. Even though it cut spending immediately after the October presidential elections in order to reduce the deficit, further cuts may prove politically costly, considering Venezuela will likely hold another presidential election in the coming months, pending Chávez’s health.

A more pressing problem the government is facing is the scarcity of basic food staples, as evidenced by a recent video showing consumers scrambling for chicken in a supermarket that quickly went viral.

Importers realized that cheap dollars were on their way out. Currently, dollars are being sold on the black market at 21BsF per dollar. Therefore, if you are a businessman or a government bureaucrat lucky enough to nab a few greenbacks, you have every incentive to sell them in the black market instead of using them to import the goods you were supposed to be importing. This creates a situation whereby dollars assigned to import basic staples are used for financial arbitrage — causing a shortage of everyday items. Ordinary Venezuelans also instinctively understand the relationship between the dollar and their personal economics, and demand for dollars typically shoots up when they suspect that a devaluation is in the pipes. As if on cue, immediately after this latest devaluation, Venezuelans flocked to electronics stores and airlines agencies to buy whatever they could that was still priced at the old dollar rate.

By devaluing, the government is lowering the budget deficit, which still lies at a hefty 5.3 percent of GDP, according to estimations by the Bank of America. Narrowing the gap between the official and black market exchange rate lessens the incentive to engage in arbitrage instead of importing goods, which may ameliorate the scarcity problem.

However, the move will prove costly. This measure alone means Venezuelan real wages have fallen, in terms of dollars, and inflation is sure to shoot up. One is left wondering what other options the government had but failed to enact.

This is where the Chinese angle comes in.

In the last few weeks, reports have surfaced that the Chinese, the main underwriters of last year´s enormous fiscal deficit, are growing frustrated with their Venezuelan counterpart; they are in no mood to continue lending to the government, and felt that Venezuela sacrificed productive investments for cheap pre-electoral spending. In spite of this, reports surfaced that Venezuela is asking China for more cash.

Last week, newly-appointed Foreign Minister Elías Jaua traveled to Beijing, returning with a vague statement that the Chinese ratified their interest “in continuing to cooperate with Venezuela” and that President Xi Jinping sent “a hug” to Hugo Chávez.

Too bad, because he wasn’t sent to Beijing to fetch “hugs.” What Jaua did not say is that he failed to secure new funding from China — and this may have triggered the move to devalue.

As I have already argued, Venezuela is like a Ponzi scheme: Continued returns to lenders rely on getting fresh new funding. Once the funding dries up, the losses begin to accumulate.

After last week’s devaluation, it looks like the loss is borne on the backs of ordinary Venezuelans, who woke up earning less and paying more for practically everything.

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